Infinity Rover in Sri Lanka: USDT Packages, Regulatory Determination and the Missing Recovery Record

Evidence cut-off: 28 August 2026

Method and status. This documentary case study distinguishes company representations, regulatory determinations, investigator allegations, reported procedural events and final judicial findings. It does not determine civil or criminal liability. No interviews were conducted for this edition. It is independent academic and investigative analysis, not legal, financial, investment or recovery advice, and has not been reviewed or endorsed by Cardiff Metropolitan University. Documentary corrections may be submitted through the corrections channel; material corrections, clarifications and later developments will be identified in the article’s update record.

Within this series, Infinity Rover is the clearest recent Sri Lankan example of cryptocurrency functioning as both the public investment frame and the stated payment rail of an officially prohibited scheme. The company’s public terms represented IR Power Plan packages as purchasable only in USDT, referred to package renewal and team-member commissions, and described withdrawals to external crypto wallets. Other company-controlled pages promoted crypto mining, USDT exchange, cryptocurrency trading and forex trading (Infinity Rover, 2024; Infinity Rover, n.d.a).

The regulatory conclusion is equally clear. On 1 July 2026, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) said that it had investigated, ascertained and determined that Infinity Rover (Pvt) Ltd had “engaged, conducted and promoted a prohibited scheme” under section 83C of the Banking Act (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2026a).

The public enforcement outcome is much less developed. Hiru News reported five days later that investigators had informed the Colombo Chief Magistrate of an investigation begun following a CBSL complaint. The report supplied no hearing date, case number, named suspect, arrest, charge or asset order (Hiru News, 2026). No later Infinity Rover-specific public procedural or recovery record was located through 28 August 2026.

The result is a case with unusually strong primary evidence of crypto-facing representations and an authoritative regulatory determination, but no public measure of participant exposure and no visible path from investigation to preserved property or claimant payment.

The answer in brief

Six conclusions are supported at the evidence cut-off.

1. CBSL made a section 83C determination. Its notice of 1 July 2026 states that the Bank conducted an investigation and determined that Infinity Rover had engaged, conducted and promoted a prohibited scheme. That is an authoritative regulatory conclusion, not a criminal conviction (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2026a).

2. Infinity Rover’s own terms establish a direct USDT connection. The public terms said that an IR Power Plan package had to be purchased in USDT before an account became active. They also described an eight per cent withdrawal deduction, a 25-USDT minimum withdrawal and transfer to a participant-supplied wallet following identity verification (Infinity Rover, 2024).

3. The represented model included package renewal and team-linked commissions. The terms referred to registration fees, package upgrades and repurchases, maturity purchases, and commissions when team members renewed packages. The public pages do not expose the complete referral structure, package prices or compensation algorithm (Infinity Rover, 2024).

4. Trading was represented, not independently verified. Infinity Rover described crypto mining, forex, USDT buying and selling, and crypto trading. Its terms connected benefit payments to institutional capacity and represented profitability from crypto trading as a condition affecting payment. No audited trading statement, exchange account, wallet attribution or transaction history was located (Infinity Rover, 2024; Infinity Rover, n.d.a).

5. A reported investigative submission is not a filed prosecution. Hiru News reported on 6 July that investigators had informed Colombo Chief Magistrate Asanga S. Bodaragama of an investigation. Because the article did not identify the underlying hearing date, case number or accused person, this edition records it as a reported investigative submission—not a charge, trial or finding (Hiru News, 2026).

6. The public record does not quantify loss or recovery. No reliable Infinity Rover-specific participant count, amount received, net-loss assessment, frozen balance, restrained wallet, forfeiture, realisation or claimant distribution was located.

Evidence labels used in this case study

Four labels prevent the limited record from being overstated:

• Company representation records what an Infinity Rover-controlled website or account page said. It does not prove a trade, payment, return, licence or corporate fact.
• Regulatory determination means CBSL’s formal conclusion under section 83C. It is legally significant but is not a court conviction.
• Reported investigative submission means a media account that investigators placed information before a court. Unless a signed order or complete filing is available, it is not treated as an adjudicated fact.
• Bounded negative search means that no qualifying record was located in the public repositories searched. It does not prove that an unindexed, restricted or non-public record does not exist.

Without these labels, website language becomes audited performance, a regulatory notice becomes a conviction, and an investigation mentioned in court becomes a prosecution.

The public corporate presentation and chronology

No authenticated current Registrar of Companies extract was located. This article therefore does not assign an incorporation date, directors, shareholders, beneficial owners or current filing status. CBSL’s notice controls the identity of the regulated subject within its scope; it does not authenticate the wider group structure presented online (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2026a).

Infinity Rover’s website used an Old Kottawa Road contact address and described the organisation as a group operating across digital currency, plantations, renewable energy, education, fashion, real estate, travel and other sectors. The site asserted ten years of market experience. No evidence reviewed independently validates that duration, and the claim cannot be converted into a ten-year corporate operating history (Infinity Rover, n.d.b).

The principal IR Power Plan terms display a last-update date of 18 September 2024. A linked IR Power Plan 2 account page displays a last-update date of 17 June 2025. These are self-reported page dates, not independently authenticated release records. They nevertheless establish that two materially different sets of terms were publicly presented before CBSL’s July 2026 notice (Infinity Rover, 2024; IR Power Plan, 2025).

The most important public dates are therefore:

Event date	Publication or observation date	What the record supports
Self-described update date: 18 September 2024	Checked 28 August 2026	Infinity Rover’s terms publicly described the first IR Power Plan, including USDT-only activation, renewal conditions and wallet withdrawal terms (Infinity Rover, 2024).
Self-described update date: 17 June 2025	Checked 28 August 2026	A linked IR Power Plan 2 page publicly described a second set of duration and income-cap terms (IR Power Plan, 2025).
Underlying investigation and determination dates undisclosed	1 July 2026	CBSL published its section 83C investigation and determination. The notice does not back-date those underlying steps (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2026a).
Hearing or submission date undisclosed	6 July 2026	Hiru News reported that investigators had informed the Colombo Chief Magistrate of a probe following a CBSL complaint (Hiru News, 2026).
No new Infinity Rover determination identified	5 August 2026	CBSL carried Infinity Rover forward on its cumulative list while announcing a new determination concerning TM App (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2026b).
28 August 2026	28 August 2026	Public home, terms, account-login and USDT peer-to-peer portal pages remained reachable. Availability alone does not establish continuing transactions.

What Infinity Rover represented itself to offer

The company’s digital-currency page presented the IR Power Plan as part of a wider financial offering. It described crypto mining, forex trading, buying and selling USDT, and trading Bitcoin and other cryptoassets. EconomyNext’s contemporaneous 1 July report also recorded that the website claimed a crypto-trading platform operating across spot, margin and futures markets (EconomyNext, 2026; Infinity Rover, n.d.a).

Those statements establish marketing content. They do not establish that Infinity Rover operated an exchange, held customer assets, executed spot or derivative trades, mined cryptocurrency, maintained reserves, or earned the represented returns. No public audit, exchange authorisation, proof-of-reserves statement, mining-pool record or trading-account statement was located.

The website also exposed more than a brochure. At the evidence cut-off, it provided:

• a login path using an “IR Number”;
• a public registration link, although this review did not create an account;
• a separate USDT peer-to-peer merchant sign-in and sign-up interface; and
• a linked IR Power Plan 2 login using an “IRPP Number” (Infinity Rover, 2026a, 2026b; IR Power Plan, 2025).

These interfaces show that account and USDT-facing infrastructure was publicly presented. A reachable login or registration form does not prove that onboarding could be completed, that a wallet was funded or that a transaction occurred.

The IR Power Plan mechanics in the public terms

The first IR Power Plan terms connect a package, crypto payment, an account placement and represented benefits. They state that only USDT could be used to buy the package and activate an account. They also describe registration fees varying by package, upgrading and repurchasing packages, and buying a similar or higher-value package at maturity (Infinity Rover, 2024).

Recruitment-linked language appears in the treatment of a participant’s “team”. The terms say that commissions would return when team members renewed their packages, at a stated 50 per cent. That is evidence of a represented connection between team-member package renewal and participant commission. It does not expose the entire recruitment tree, prove that each participant recruited others or show that any commission was actually paid (Infinity Rover, 2024).

The same terms describe an account activation period of 15 months and automatic inactivation if income became three times the invested amount before that period. This is best understood as a displayed cap or account condition, not proof that a threefold return was guaranteed or achieved. Elsewhere, the terms state that the package was valid for 300 business days, creating a duration inconsistency that the public page does not reconcile (Infinity Rover, 2024).

The withdrawal terms are equally specific as representations. They describe:

• an eight per cent deduction labelled a crypto-wallet fee;
• a minimum withdrawal of 25 USDT;
• identity and wallet-address verification;
• transfers from a company crypto wallet to the participant’s wallet; and
• dashboard fields for total earned, total invested and last withdrawals (Infinity Rover, 2024).

No company-controlled public wallet address, participant transaction hash or network identification accompanies those terms. Without an attributed address and transaction evidence, the displayed workflow cannot be audited on-chain.

The terms also contain a losses provision. They say that if the institution incurred losses from crypto trading, benefits might not be paid in full and payments would depend on financial capacity; the original package amount would receive priority, subject to the institution’s ability to pay. This is a contractual representation about allocation during a claimed loss condition. It does not prove that trading generated profits, that reserves existed or that principal was legally or practically protected (Infinity Rover, 2024).

A second plan with materially different terms

The linked IR Power Plan 2 page uses the same Kottawa contact details, Infinity Rover email domain and brand references. Its terms say that accounts lasted 480 weeks and became inactive if income reached six times the amount invested. They also retain USDT-only package purchase, an eight per cent withdrawal deduction, a 25-USDT minimum and wallet withdrawals (IR Power Plan, 2025).

The difference from 15 months and three times to 480 weeks and six times is material. The public record does not explain when the second plan was offered, whether it replaced or coexisted with the first, which participants received which terms, or how either return condition was funded. This article therefore does not combine them into one universal Infinity Rover contract.

What CBSL determined

CBSL’s 1 July notice is brief and controlling. It states that, under section 83C of the Banking Act, the Bank conducted an investigation and determined that Infinity Rover (Pvt) Ltd had engaged, conducted and promoted a prohibited scheme (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2026a).

Section 83C prohibits initiating, offering, promoting, advertising, conducting, financing, managing or directing a scheme in which a participant contributes money or monetary value and promised benefits depend largely on growth in participants or their contributions. “Monetary value” is defined broadly enough to include a medium of exchange and stored value. The use of USDT therefore does not take a qualifying contribution-and-recruitment arrangement outside the provision merely because the contribution is not made in Sri Lankan rupees (Sri Lanka, 1988, s.83C).

CBSL’s public notice does not disclose:

• when or how the underlying complaint was received;
• when the investigation or internal determination concluded;
• which package, webpage, payment or recruitment act was examined;
• a participant count or amount received;
• any named director, promoter or participant;
• a referral decision by the Attorney-General;
• an arrest, filed charge or court case;
• an account or wallet restraint; or
• a recovery or restitution process.

Those omissions do not weaken the announced regulatory determination. They define what cannot be inferred from it.

What was reportedly placed before court

Hiru News published a short report on 6 July 2026 stating that the Financial and Commercial Crime Investigation Division had informed Colombo Chief Magistrate Asanga S. Bodaragama that an investigation had been launched. It attributed to investigators the position that the probe began following a complaint from what the report called the “Consumer Affairs Department” of CBSL. The same report later referred to the Criminal Investigation Department (Hiru News, 2026).

The terminology is recorded rather than silently harmonised. CBSL’s public complaint route uses the name Financial Consumer Relations Department, while Hiru used “Consumer Affairs Department”. The underlying complaint and filing were not publicly available to resolve the wording (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, n.d.; Hiru News, 2026).

More importantly, the report does not state when the information was presented, identify a case or B-report number, name a suspect, or report an arrest, summons, remand, bail, charge or judicial finding. The safe procedural formulation is therefore:

Hiru News reported on 6 July 2026 that investigators had informed the Colombo Chief Magistrate of an investigation into Infinity Rover following a CBSL complaint.

It would be inaccurate to write that a prosecution began on 6 July, that Infinity Rover was charged, or that the Magistrate found the company’s operators guilty.

Website availability after the determination

Infinity Rover’s public home page, digital-currency page, terms, account-login path and USDT peer-to-peer portal remained reachable when checked on 28 August 2026. The linked IR Power Plan 2 login and terms page was also publicly accessible (Infinity Rover, 2024; Infinity Rover, 2026a, 2026b; Infinity Rover, n.d.a, n.d.b; IR Power Plan, 2025).

This observation corrects any categorical claim that the public website had disappeared immediately after CBSL’s notice. It does not establish that the prohibited scheme remained active. Public pages can remain online while registration, deposits, internal accounts or withdrawals are disabled. This review did not register, log in, transmit identity information, connect a wallet or attempt a transaction.

The distinction matters for enforcement design. Publishing a determination informs the public, but a technically reachable interface can continue to create an appearance of ordinary operation. A transparent response would identify whether access has been restricted, preserved for evidence, left online pending process, or continues outside Sri Lankan control. No Infinity Rover-specific official explanation of that status was located.

Scale, assets and recovery

No reliable Infinity Rover-specific participant count, package-sales total, USDT amount received or net-loss calculation was located. Generic statements about the number of Sri Lankans affected by pyramid or crypto scams cannot be reassigned to this case. Nor can dashboard labels such as “total invested” become aggregate evidence without access to the underlying participant ledger.

The same restraint applies to crypto tracing. The public terms refer to company and participant wallets, Binance and Trust Wallet, but they disclose no address, network or transaction hash. A brand reference to a wallet application or exchange does not establish that the company held an account there or that a particular address belonged to it.

No public case-specific record reviewed establishes:

• a traced Infinity Rover wallet or exchange account;
• a bank-account freeze or High Court confirmation;
• seizure of devices, cash or property;
• a restraint, prohibition or forfeiture order;
• realised asset value;
• an admitted or judicially determined liability; or
• an enforcement-related payment to claimants.

Sri Lanka’s statutory framework supplies investigation, restraint and proceeds-management routes, including treatment of a section 83C offence as unlawful activity for money-laundering purposes. The Proceeds of Crime Act had commenced before CBSL’s determination. The Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act No. 16 of 2026 was certified on 4 August 2026, after Hiru’s report was published, and expressly brought virtual assets within its expanded property framework. Neither enactment proves case-specific tracing, restraint or management. A credible recovery account still requires a documented chain from attribution and preservation to adjudication, realisation and distribution (Sri Lanka, 1988, s.83C; Sri Lanka, 2006, s.35; Sri Lanka, 2011; Sri Lanka, 2025a, 2025b; Sri Lanka, 2026).

What the case changes in the article series

Infinity Rover strengthens and refines the conclusions of the earlier four-case series.

First, the cryptocurrency role is unusually direct. Sports Chain reporting described rupee payments and a represented conversion into USDT and internal units; the F3C record did not establish crypto as its payment rail. Infinity Rover’s own terms expressly required USDT for package activation and described withdrawal to a crypto wallet. The evidence still stops short of proving that each represented transaction occurred.

Secondly, the case shows why a corporate presentation and financial authorisation must remain separate. Even where incorporation is later established through an authenticated record, it would not validate a compensation structure or prove authority to provide trading, deposit-taking or investment services.

Thirdly, the regulatory-to-recovery gap has appeared in a case determined only weeks before this evidence cut-off. CBSL’s public classification is clear, and reporting describes an investigation brought to the Magistrate’s attention. The public record still does not connect that process to a case identifier, asset-preservation status or claimant route.

Fourthly, the accessible website adds a prevention problem. A person searching the name after the determination could still encounter a polished multi-sector corporate presentation, crypto services, account portals and detailed package terms. A regulator’s notice needs to be findable at the point where a person evaluates the platform, not only in a separate official list.

Practical warning signs preserved for the safety hub

The article does not use a checklist to decide liability. It does preserve case-specific representations that a member of the public can examine before paying:

• package activation only after a USDT payment;
• benefits linked to package renewal or team-member renewal;
• repurchase or movement to a higher package after maturity;
• a multiple-of-package account cap presented without an audited trading basis;
• a non-refundable package term;
• a withdrawal deduction labelled a crypto-wallet fee;
• dashboard numbers that cannot be verified from a public blockchain; and
• a provision reducing represented benefits when the company says crypto trading generated losses.

None of these features alone proves that every platform using it is unlawful. Together, they show why a prospective participant should identify the regulated entity, obtain the complete compensation and custody terms, verify where funds go, preserve the wallet and transaction details, and check current official notices before transferring USDT.

Current assessment

The defensible position at 28 August 2026 is:

CBSL has publicly established that it investigated, ascertained and determined that Infinity Rover (Pvt) Ltd engaged, conducted and promoted a prohibited scheme. Infinity Rover-controlled public terms establish that USDT packages, team-linked commissions and crypto-wallet withdrawals formed part of its represented model. Hiru News reported that investigators informed the Colombo Chief Magistrate of a probe following a CBSL complaint. The public record reviewed does not establish a filed charge, conviction, asset restraint, forfeiture or claimant recovery.

This should receive a dated update if any of the following becomes public: the underlying CBSL complaint or determination record; a complete police B-report and reliable case number; an arrest, summons or charge document; a signed prohibition, restraint, forfeiture or release order; an authenticated wallet or exchange attribution; audited package, trading or participant records; a judgment or appeal; an asset-realisation statement; or an enforcement-related claimant distribution.

References

Central Bank of Sri Lanka (n.d.) ‘Prohibited schemes — frequently asked questions’. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2026a) ‘Notice to General Public on Prohibited Pyramid Schemes’, 1 July. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Central Bank of Sri Lanka (2026b) ‘Notice to General Public on Prohibited Pyramid Schemes’, 5 August. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

EconomyNext (2026) ‘Sri Lanka CB probe determines Infinity Rover involved in prohibited scheme’, 1 July. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Hiru News (2026) ‘Infinity Rover pyramid scheme probed’, 6 July. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Infinity Rover (n.d.a) ‘Digital Currency’ [first-party promotional page]. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Infinity Rover (2024) ‘Terms and Conditions’, page states last update 18 September 2024. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Infinity Rover (n.d.b) ‘Home page’ [first-party promotional page]. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Infinity Rover (2026a) ‘Login’ [first-party account interface; accessed without interaction]. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Infinity Rover (2026b) ‘USDT P2P Merchant by Infinity Rover — sign in’ [first-party account interface; accessed without interaction]. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

IR Power Plan (2025) ‘Sign In and Terms and Conditions — IR Power Plan 2’ [first-party account and terms interface; accessed without interaction], page states last update 17 June 2025. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Sri Lanka (1988) Banking Act, No. 30 of 1988, as amended, s.83C. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Sri Lanka (2006) Prevention of Money Laundering Act, No. 5 of 2006. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Sri Lanka (2011) Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, No. 40 of 2011. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Sri Lanka (2025a) Proceeds of Crime Act, No. 5 of 2025. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Sri Lanka (2025b) Order commencing the Proceeds of Crime Act on 1 June 2025, Gazette Extraordinary No. 2438/24, 27 May. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).

Sri Lanka (2026) Prevention of Money Laundering (Amendment) Act, No. 16 of 2026. Available at: Original (Accessed: 28 August 2026).